

A DSL for the safe deployment of Runtime Monitors in Cyber-Physical Systems

1. Background

- ❑ **Guaranteeing that Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) do not fail** is a non-trivial problem, especially with the adoption of **complex software solutions**;
- ❑ **Formal Methods** (rigorous mathematical and logical techniques) can aid in the task of obtaining proofs about the **correctness** of CPS
 - ❑ **Runtime Verification (RV)** uses monitors and formal specifications to, during runtime, validate a set of properties.

2. The Problem

- ❑ The **deployment of RV solutions** causes an inevitable **overhead** in the system;
- ❑ If **not correctly deployed**, RV solutions can **compromise the security and safety** requirements of a system;
- ❑ **Lack of formalism** in the current state-of-the-art when it comes to the **integration of monitoring solutions** in CPS;
- ❑ Performing formal verifications is a tedious and **time-consuming** task.

3. Proposed Solution

- ❑ Apply **formal methods** to **guarantee** that deployed software monitoring solutions comply with the target system's **safety requirements**;
- ❑ Abstract formalism from the system's developer by creating a **Domain-Specific Language (DSL)** and a set of tools to support it;
- ❑ **Centralize and automate** formal verification procedures for the correct deployment of monitors in a given target system.

4. Proposed DSL and Associated Toolset

- Our proposed DSL, and its associated toolset, must allow the developer to:
- ❑ Express **functional and non-functional** properties to be verified during runtime;
 - ❑ **Verify**, statically, the **schedulability** of a system
 - ❑ We plan to leverage the literature on the topic of **mode-change schedulability analysis** to enforce better use of system resources;
 - ❑ We plan on supporting a **broad set of scheduling algorithms** and **hardware architectures**;
 - ❑ **Automate the code generation** of the monitors and monitoring architectures following a **Correct-by-Construction** approach (i.e., complying with a set of formally defined requirements)
 - ❑ Leverage state-of-the-art formal tools like **model checkers, SMT solvers, and proof-assistants**.

Bellow, we illustrate our initial efforts to design the DSL syntax using an **automotive electric/electronic architecture** as a **use case example**:

DSL Syntax – Initial Design

```
node DC_1(scheduler = rm, cores = 2, alloc_policy = global){
  mode m_1 {
    task tsk_1{T = 10 ms, D = 10 ms, WCET = 5 ms};
    task tsk_2{T = 5 ms, D = 3 ms, WCET = 2 ms};
    monitor mon_1{T = 5 ms, D = 3 ms, WCET = 2 ms};
  }
  mode m_2 {
    task tsk_1{T = 30 ms, D = 20 ms, WCET = 15 ms};
    task tsk_2{T = 5 ms, D = 3 ms, WCET = 2 ms};
    monitor mon_1{T = 3 ms, D = 2 ms, WCET = 1 ms};
  }
}
node ECU_1 (scheduler = rm, cores = 1){
  mode m_1 {
    task tsk_3{...}; task tsk_4{...}; task tsk_5{...};
  }
  mode m_2 {
    task tsk_5{...}; task tsk_6{...}; monitor mon_2 {...};
  }
}
```

5. Benefits

- ❑ **Enhanced security and safety** of monitored systems;
- ❑ **Reduced development and testing time**
 - ❑ Potential overall project cost reduction;
- ❑ **Centralized tool** for the deployment of monitoring solutions.